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Abstract: The markets for audiovisual content are subject to dynamic change. Where once 
“traditional” (free-to-air, cable, satellite) television was dominating, i.e. linear audiovisual 
media services, markets display nowadays strong growth of different types of video-on-
demand (VoD), i.e. nonlinear audiovisual media services, including both Paid-for VoD like 
Amazon Prime and Netflix and Advertised-financed VoD like YouTube. Competition policy 
decisions in such dynamic markets are always particularly challenging. The German compe-
tition authority was presented such a challenge when, at the beginning of the 2010s, Ger-
man television providers sought to enter online VoD markets with the help of cooperative 
platforms. We review the antitrust concerns that were raised back then in an ex post analy-
sis. In doing so, we first discuss the dynamic development of the German VoD markets dur-
ing the last decade. In the second part of this paper, we derive four aspects, in which the 
previous antitrust analysis cannot be upheld from today’s perspective. First, relevant impli-
cations of modern platform economics were neglected. Second, some inconsistencies in 
the assessment of the two projects appear to be inappropriate. Third, the emerging com-
petitive pressure of international VoD providers was strongly underestimated. Fourth, the 
question of market power in online advertising markets looks very different at the end of 
the decade. 
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1 Introduction 
Watching video on the internet is still on the rise not least due to broadband con-
nections as well as technologies favoring video usage on mobile devices (Crawford 
2015; Kupferschmitt 2015). According to the ARD/ZDF Onlinestudie 2017, 72 per 
cent of the German speaking population from 14+ years watch moving images1 on 
the internet at least rarely, whereas 53 per cent do so at least once per week (Koch 
& Frees 2017: 443; Kupferschmitt 2017: 448). The latter figures are highest in the 
young(er) age groups (14-29 years: 88 per cent; 30-49 years: 70 per cent), whereas 
consumption decreases in the older age groups (50-69 years: 34 per cent; 70+ 
years: 17 per cent) (Koch & Frees 2017: 443; see also table 1). Altogether, con-
sumption of video streaming services (e.g. Netflix, Amazon Prime Instant Video, 
Maxdome, etc.) has increased within one year by 11 percentage points (from 12 
per cent at least once per week in 2016 to 23 per cent in 2017; Koch & Frees 2017: 
443). Lower frequency consumption even increased by 20 percentage points to 38 
per cent in 2017 (Kupferschmitt 2017: 448-449). 
 
Table 1: Video usage on the internet in 2016 and 2017 – at least once per week 
(German speaking population 14+ years in per cent) 
Source: translated from Koch & Frees (2017: 443). 
                                                          
1  The term moving images or video usage includes – according to the ARD/ZDF-Onlinestudie 2017 the follow-
ing: video portals such as YouTube, moving images on Facebook, video streaming services (e.g. Netflix); TV 
shows on the internet live or non-linear, Live TV on the internet, watching TV shows non-linear, video pod-
casts, shows in the online media libraries of the TV stations (Koch & Frees 2017). 
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In line with consumption growth, the overall market for audiovisual online content 
in general and video-on-demand (VoD) in particular displays high dynamics. Among 
the various players are online media libraries of traditional TV stations (both com-
mercial TV providers and public service broadcasters), video portals such as 
YouTube as well as video streaming providers such as Netflix and Maxdome – just 
to mention a few. Particularly, the market for video streaming services is currently 
highly competitive. At the beginning of October 2015 Amazon, for instance, an-
nounced to remove devices of Apple (i.e. Apple TV) and Google (i.e. Google 
Chromecast) from their website, informing the market place providers that from 
October, 29th, 2015 on those devices cannot be sold anymore on Amazon (Horizont 
Online 2015).2 Watchever, the German VoD player of the French media company 
Vivendi, by contrast, launched a new content concept in order to set itself apart 
from its competitors in October 2015 – however, at the end of 2016 Vivendi shut 
down Watchever (Schobelt 2015; Meedia 2016). In addition to this, new and well 
established players from abroad have entered the market, such as Amazon Prime 
Instant Video in February 2014 or Netflix in September 2014. Both have taken lead-
ing positions in the German VoD market throughout the past years. This year, in 
2018, the traditional broadcasters such as ProSiebenSat.1 as well as RTL announced 
their plans to further expand their video-on-demand activities in order to compete 
with the dominant players Netflix and Amazon (Meedia 2018b; Winterbauer 2018). 
Also, Deutsche Telekom aims to play a role in the market and announced plans to 
start investing in own content production as well as to open up their streaming-
service Entertain TV for non-Telekom customers, the latter effective from October 
2018 on (Meedia 2018c).  
Quite in contrast to old, rather sclerotic markets, new upcoming markets such as 
the VoD markets are usually not associated with existing market power that may be 
abused by dominating incumbents. Still, the German competition agency (Bun-
deskartellamt; Federal Cartel Office of Germany; FCO) already about eight years ago 
intervened into the market when Germany’s leading commercial TV broadcasters 
planned to join forces to enter the VoD market – and public service broadcasters 
                                                          
2  This sales ban is still on so that no Apple TV or Google Chromecasts can be purchased on Amazon. This still 
holds for Apple although Apple TV has started to include the Amazon Video app on Apple TV – once the 
reason behind Amazon’s decision (Pakalski 2017).  
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pursued plans to launch a competing (but otherwise similar) project. Against the 
background of market power concerns, the FCO blocked the cooperative efforts by 
commercial television broadcasters to establish a new VoD platform (the so-called 
Amazonas project) and raised comprehensive antitrust concerns against the similar 
plan by the public service broadcasters (the so-called Germany’s Gold project), lead-
ing to the project being abandoned.  
In this paper, we first present recent developments in the German VoD markets in-
cluding business models, market structure dynamics, and the (perhaps special) role 
of YouTube (section 2). Based upon the market development, we review the anti-
competitive concerns of the FCO in the Amazonas- and Germany’s Gold-cases from 
a modern media economics perspective (section 3). This ex post analysis reveals 
important insights into competition policy in dynamic markets. More specifically, 
with hindsight, some of the antitrust concerns, particularly raised against Amazo-
nas but also against Germany’s Gold, cannot be upheld.  
In order to specify the term video-on-demand, we follow the 2010 Audiovisual Me-
dia Services Directive from the European Union (2010: L95/12). According to it, lin-
ear audiovisual media services are services delivered by a media service provider 
“[…] for simultaneous viewing of programmes on the basis of a programme 
schedule”. Television broadcasting is, thus, falling under this definition. Non-linear 
audiovisual media services (also referred to as on-demand audiovisual media ser-
vices) by contrast are services delivered by a media service provider “[…] for the 
viewing of programmes at the moment chosen by the user and at his individual 
request on the basis of a catalogue of programmes selected by the media services 
provider”. The latter corresponds to the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) definition of VoD3: “A service in which the end-user can, on demand, select 
and view a video content and where the end-user can control the temporal order in 
which the video content is viewed (e.g. the ability to start the viewing, pause, fast 
forward, rewind, etc.)” (ITU 2009: 6). A report by the European Commission (2014: 
7-9) classifies on-demand services as displayed in table 2. While we follow the un-
derstanding of the terms linear and non-linear audiovisual media services/video-on-
                                                          
3  For differing VoD definitions see, for instance, NPA Conseil (2007); European Audiovisual Observatory & 
DDM (2009); Kuper (2009); Wippersberg & Scolik (2009); Martens & Herfert (2013a, 2013b); Woldt (2014). 
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demand in this paper, we do not want to preclude economic market delineation by 
these definitions, in particular as the dynamics of the markets imply ongoing en-
dogenous changes of market definitions in this industry.  
 
Classification Subcategories 
 
ODMAS On demand audiovisual 
media services according to the 
AVMS Directive 
Catch-Up TV (also referred to as Replay TV), e.g. media libraries 
of private or public service broadcasters 
Preview TV, i.e. users pay for a TV program to watch it prior to 
their broadcast release 
VoD, i.e. providing on demand access to a catalogue of audio-
visual services, not being dependent on their broadcast on 
television. E.g. Netflix, Amazon Prime Video 
Branded services on sharing platforms 
 
Other on demand audiovisual 
services not falling within the 
definition of the AVMS Directive 
Video-sharing platforms, e.g. YouTube 
Social networks allowing video upload by users, e.g. Facebook 
Video pages of newspapers websites, e.g. website with video 
content on Spiegel Online 
Promotional websites with video content 
Table 2: Classification of on-demand audiovisual services4  
Source: modified and extended from European Commission (2014: 9) 
 
2 The Video-on-Demand Market in Germany 
2.1 Business Models on the VoD Market 
VoD providers use fairly diverse and different types of business models. Industry 
studies usually distinguish two main categories depending on the financing of the 
services – namely user financed VoD models from advertising financed VoD models.  
(i) Advertising Financed VoD Models (AVoD) 
To start with the latter, video-on-demand providers can (partly) finance their ser-
vices through advertising revenues, also referred to as AVoD (advertising financed 
or ad-supported video-on-demand) (inter alia, Bitkom 2017b; Goldmedia 2018). In 
this model, the VoD provider offers the streaming of videos to the user “for free”, 
more precisely without monetary payment from the user. In return, the user “pays” 
                                                          
4  See European Commission (2014: 9-11) for further details on the classification and subcategories. 
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with her “attention” while watching the videos by being exposed to particularly 
different in-stream-video ad formats such as pre-, mid-, postroll-advertising.5 Ad-
vertising financed VoD Models show the characteristics of a platform market6 as do 
advertising-financed media markets in general (inter alia, Dewenter 2003; Anderson 
& Gabszewicz 2006; Gabszewicz et al. 2006; Kaiser & Wright 2006; Crampes et al. 
2009; Lindstädt 2010; Seamans & Zhu 2010; Reisinger 2012; Anderson & Jullien 
2015; Crawford 2015; Gabszewicz et al. 2015; Gimpel 2015; Peitz & Reisinger 
2015; Budzinski & Kuchinke 2018; Tichem & Tuinstra 2018). Video-on-demand pro-
viders as platforms serve two distinct customer groups – namely users and adver-
tisers – through internalizing the indirect network externalities that occur between 
those two customer groups. An increasing presence of users on an AVoD-platform 
increases the utility for each advertiser placing advertising on this platform because 
of the increased reach and the subsequently increased probability to turn advertis-
ing into turnover. This represents a positive indirect network externality. The other 
way around, however, is more ambiguous: an increasing amount of advertising 
need not necessarily increase utility of each user; for some user it will actually rep-
resent a disutility. Altogether, the indirect network externality in this direction may 
be positive or negative but it certainly will be lower than the one from users to ad-
vertisers. Consequently, the platform experiences incentives to subsidize the user 
side (monetary price of zero) and shift the financing of the service on the advertis-
ing side (efficient asymmetric price structure). Managing the indirect network ex-
ternalities like this can be an important growth factor for a VoD-platform and pro-
mote profitability. Since the platform character of a VoD-service is not natural (i.e. 
alternative, non-platform business models exist as well, see below), AVoD is an arti-
ficial platform, i.e. a strategically chosen business model (profit maximization). 
 
AVoD can be viewed as a special variant of data-based services (Budzinski 2016; 
Budzinski & Kuchinke 2018; Budzinski & Stöhr 2018). Personalized user data has 
                                                          
5  These in-stream video ads have to be distinguished from in-page video ads that are video ads embedded in 
banners (Bundeskartellamt 2018a: 1). 
6 Platform economics or the theory of two-sided markets has its origin in economic analyses of the credit card 
industry in the context of antitrust law suits filed against MasterCard and Visa. See for platform economics 
in general Evans (2002, 2003, 2004); Caillaud & Jullien (2003); Rochet & Tirole (2003, 2006); Evans & 
Schmalensee (2005, 2007); Roson (2005); Armstrong (2006); Haucap & Stühmeier (2016).  
 
 
7 
 
become an important factor particularly when it comes to modern digital online 
services: the user “pays” with the provision of her personal data. The platform ele-
ment of the AVoD-business model actually runs on so-called targeted advertising 
where the platform employs personalized user data in order to provide each user 
individually with tailor-made advertising according to her stated (e.g. comments on 
goods at Amazon, Facebook-likes, etc.) or revealed (e.g. cookie-tracked or account-
based data on her individual search, movement and consumption history on the 
internet) preferences. In combination with the indirect network externality, target-
ed advertising further increases the effectiveness of advertisements and, thus, fur-
ther increases the willingness-to-pay of advertisers. A second way of utilizing per-
sonalized user data are individualized services like algorithm-based individualized 
recommendation and search services on the platform. Based upon the individual 
history of videos watched and positive comments, each user receives her own indi-
vidual recommendations which other videos she might like. And when she searches 
within the platform, search results are listed according to her preferences as the 
algorithm has concluded them from the available personalized data. Both individu-
alized services benefit the user and, c.p., increase her video consumption on the 
platform, thus, at the end of the day, increasing turnover and profits of the plat-
form. Thus, the volume and the quality of personalized data influence competitive-
ness.7 
 
Providers using this type of AVoD business model are, for instance, YouTube, MSN 
Movies as well as Hulu (a provider in the United States).  
(ii) User Financed VoD Models (PVoD) 
User financed VoD models, by contrast, refer to the situation where the user direct-
ly pays with money for consuming VoD content. Currently, this is the most com-
mon financing model among leading commercial VoD providers (e.g. Bitkom 
2017a, 2017b) – with the notable exception of video portals à la YouTube. We dis-
                                                          
7  Other data-based business models include data-based price discrimination, data trading and data technolo-
gies, which currently do not appear to be relevant in the prevailing AVoD business models. See generally 
Budzinski (2017), Budzinski & Kuchinke (2018), and Budzinski & Stöhr (2018).  
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tinguish two different subcategories (modified from Berthelmann 2018: 16). Both 
can be applied to streaming and downloading. 
• Pay-Per-View: this type is also referred to as transactional video-on-demand 
(TVoD). It refers to a time-limited access to the video content wherefore the 
user has to make a one-time payment. The content is available only for a lim-
ited time period (e.g. 24 hours). An example is, for instance, the iTunes store 
where videos can be rented. 
• Flatrate-Pricing: this service is also known as subscription-based video-on-
demand (SVoD). By paying a flatrate subscription fee (e.g. monthly) the user 
has unlimited access to the video content offered by the provider. Examples 
are, for instance Netflix or Amazon Prime Video. 
In the following, we summarize both the TVoD and the SVoD model under the 
term paid-for video-on-demand (PVoD). Examples include Maxdome, Netflix, Ama-
zon Prime Video, Google Play, Apple iTunes, and Sky Online (Bitkom 2017a). 
 
2.2 Germany’s VoD Market – Structure, Dynamics, and Relevant Players 
The digital distribution of video content has become increasingly important within 
the German video rental market. Figure 1 shows the developments of the revenues 
and the digital share in the video rental market in Germany from 2008 until 2015. 
In 2015, already 66 per cent of the revenues have been generated through digital 
video. 
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Figure 1: Development of revenues (in million Euros) and digital share (in per cent) in the video rental market in 
Germany from 2008-2015 
Source: translated from BMWI (2017: 112) 
 
The media market for audiovisual online content in Germany is highly dynamic – 
not least due to the recipients’ increasing interest of video usage on the internet 
throughout the past years. Figure 2 shows the developments of video usage from 
2007 until 2017. According to this figure, video consumption at least on a rarely 
base increased from 28 per cent of all users in 2007 up to 72 per cent in 2017. 
Weekly video consumption rocketed from 16 per cent in 2008 up to 56 per cent in 
2016, however, then for the first time dropped 3 percentage points from 2016 to 
2017 resulting in 53 per cent of the German speaking population 14+ years using 
video content on the internet on a weekly base (Kupferschmitt 2017: 448).  
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Figure 2: Development of video usage on the internet from 2007 until 2017 (in per cent) 
Source: translated from Kupferschmitt (2017: 448) 
 
According to a Bitkom (2017a) survey, 77 per cent of the German internet users 
(14+ years) stream TV shows, movies, or other types of video over the internet. The 
younger the target group, the more attractive video streaming gets (14-29-years 
old: 88 per cent; 30-49-years old: 90 per cent) (ibid.; see also table 1). According to 
the 2017 Digitization Report of the Medienanstalten, 42.2 per cent (plus 9 percent-
age points compared to the previous year) of the population in Germany (14+ 
years) use OTT8 content at least once a month (Kunow 2017: 32f.). Heavy consump-
tion (i.e. at least once a week and several times a week) experienced even greater 
increases (ibid.). The most popular platforms are AVoD platforms such as YouTube9 
that have been the key drivers of the market throughout the past years (Koch & 
Frees 2017: 443; see also table 1). The BVDW (2017) survey shows that AVoD por-
                                                          
8  OTT (over-the-top) services include: television content via live streaming or via media libraries; video-on-
demand offers accessible via video portals, social media platforms or online video libraries (Kunow 2017: 
29). 
9  According to Kunow (2017: 33), YouTube ist the most used platform among video portals for VoD content 
consumption.   
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tals so far are used more often than PVoD services. However, whereas the latter 
increased from 2016 to 2017 the usage frequencies of AVoD decreased during this 
time frame.  
The importance of mobile video consumption has increased owing to faster mobile 
internet connections making it attractive and affordable to stream videos on 
smartphone and tablets (Bitkom 2017a)10, wherefore mobile is now the key driver 
in the market for moving images (von Rauchhaupt 2017) due to allowing video 
consumption independent of time and location (Berkemeyer 2017). This strength-
ens users’ incentives for using non-linear over linear services.  
According to von Rauchhaupt (2017), the German VoD market is revenue-wise the 
third largest within Europe after Great Britain and France. Figure 3 illustrates the 
development of AVoD and PVoD revenues in Germany 2010-2016 with a forecast 
for 2017 (Bitkom 2017a, 2017b). PVoD revenues (432 million in 2016) exceed AVoD 
revenues with the SVoD model forecasted to head TVoD for the first time in 2017.11 
The strong increase of SVoD revenues since 2014 coincides with the market entry 
by the two major PVoD player Amazon Prime Instant Video and Netflix, both offer-
ing a SVoD model (Goldmedia 2016). 
 
                                                          
10  According to Nielsen (2016), already 41 per cent of the Germans stream VoD on the tablet. 
11  In 2015 a PWC study showed that TVoD was still favored by the respondents (age 18+; n= 1,023). With 
specific view to age groups the TVoD model was favored by the 31-45-years old and the age group 46+. 
The 18-30-years old, however, already favored the SVoD model in 2015 (Statista 2017: 20, PwC 2015). 
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Figure 3: Development of Video-on-Demand revenues in Germany from 2010-2016 and a forecast for 2017 (in 
million Euros) 
Source: translated from Bitkom (2017b) 
 
The growth of VoD is predicted to continue. According to Goldmedia’s market 
forecast 2018-2023 an increase of gross revenues up to € 2.5 billion in 2023 (com-
ing from € 1.1 billion Euros in 2017) is expected (Absatzwirtschaft 2018; Hein 
2018; Herrmann 2018b).  
In 2016, 38 PVoD providers were competing for users and market shares in the 
German VoD market (BMWI 2017: 187; Goldmedia 2016). This market segment is 
characterized by relevant market entries (Herrmann 2018b)12 but also exits like the 
shutdown of the VoD service Watchever at the end of 2016 (Meedia 2016). Recent 
entries most prominently include Netflix13 and Amazon Prime Instant Video14, ac-
companied by increased and expanded activities of Sky and Maxdome15 (BMWI 
2017: 187).  
                                                          
12  For 2019, for instance, Disney plans on launching a VoD service for their films and series in the United 
States (Horizont Online 2017). The question is how long it will take until Disney expands its activities to oth-
er geographical markets as well. In addition to this, CBS revealed plans on expanding their streaming ser-
vices internationally (ibid.). 
13  In the United States, Netflix – a provider that originally started in 1997 as an online video rental store send-
ing DVDs and Blue Rays by postal service to its customers – has been operating in the VoD market since 
2007 (Ünal 2015: 15, 23). Netflix entered the VoD market in Germany in September 2014. 
14  Amazon Prime Instant Video started in Germany in February 2014, giving subscribers of Amazon Prime the 
opportunity of an unlimited streaming-access of more than 12,000 movies and TV shows (Jurran 2014). 
15 Maxdome is the VoD offer of the ProSiebenSat.1 group. 
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Up to now, Amazon and Netflix take the leading role in the German PVoD market 
(Absatzwirtschaft 2018). According to Goldmedia16 (2016), the most consumed 
PVoD service in Germany is Amazon. Figure 4 shows that in 2016 32 per cent of the 
VoD consumers used an Amazon pay video offer (this corresponds to 22 per cent of 
all internet users in Germany17), followed by Netflix (17 per cent of the VoD users, 
corresponding to 11 per cent of all internet users in Germany). Limited to consum-
ers between 14 and 75 years old18, a study by Deloitte displays – based on usage 
figures – Amazon with 37 per cent and Netflix with 25 per cent market share as 
PVoD market leaders in Germany in 2017 (Statista 2017: 28). Notably (see figure 4), 
the German TV station providers (linear audiovisual media services) considerably 
lack behind in the PVoD market, according to usage figures. While pay-TV provider 
Sky follows the leading duo with a 12 per cent market share, the free-TV compa-
nies are only present with ProSiebenSat.1 (Maxdome, 11 per cent). The other big 
commercial TV-provider, RTL, as well as the public service providers (ARD, ZDF) stick 
with VoD market shares below 2 per cent each. ProSiebenSat.1, RTL, ARD and ZDF 
are the companies whose attempts to establish VoD platforms raised antitrust con-
cerns by the FCO some eight years ago (see section 3). As of now, only one of them 
enjoys a relevant market position, however, with considerable distance to the top 
players. 
Amazon’s leading position may partly be due to a bundling strategy, including its 
video streaming service into the Amazon Prime subscription fee, i.e. bundling video 
streaming with premium delivery services for other goods bought from Amazon. So 
far, this strategy was not challenged by the FCO. The position of the two market 
leaders, Amazon and Netflix, may be further strengthened if forecasts based on GfK 
data analysis claiming that further market growth is likely to concentrate on these 
two players prove to be adequate (von Rauchhaupt 2017). Among the reasons may 
be their investments into own content productions and exclusive content rights.19 
Netflix, for instance, is intensively generating original content and aiming to hold 
                                                          
16  Goldmedia focuses on PVoD only and does not include AVoD such as YouTube.  
17  The ARD/ZDF-Onlinestudie 2017 showed similar figures – 22 per cent using video content on Amazon at 
least on a rarely base (Kupferschmitt 2017: 451). 
18  Base: over 2,000 consumers, only VoD users (Statista 2017: 28, based on Deloitte). 
19  The issue of the vertical integration of content production and content provision marks an upcoming trend 
in the industry with content producers starting to seek powerful positions in the video market (Gimpel 
2015). 
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exclusive rights to movies and television shows (Aguiar & Waldfogel 2018). Just 
recently Netflix announced that it is planning to offer its users over 1,000 own pro-
ductions (i.e., films, series, documentaries) in their archives by the end of 2018 (Ja-
cobsen 2018). Amazon also invests in its own content productions (W&V 2018), 
markedly in the German market (Herrmann 2018a).  
 
Figure 4: Paid VoD Usage in Germany in April 2016 (in per cent) 
Source: translated from Goldmedia (2016) 
 
2.3 Is YouTube a Relevant Market Player on the VoD Market in Germany? 
As already mentioned in the introduction, different studies use strongly varying 
market delineations for VoD markets. Some studies focus on PVoD only (e.g. 
Goldmedia 2018), other studies and reports (e.g. Medienanstalten 2017) include 
AVoD portals (e.g. YouTube), media libraries (e.g. ARD Mediathek), social network-
ing sites distributing video content (e.g. Facebook), TV platform providers (e.g. Sky) 
or gaming video platforms (e.g. Twitch). In this paper, we cannot provide a well-
derived market delineation. Lack of data is one reason but it is also controversial 
how helpful market delineation actually is when it comes to heterogeneous and 
dynamic markets (Farrell & Shapiro 2010; Kaplow 2011, 2015). For our purposes it 
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suffices to single out YouTube (originally a video sharing platform), the largest 
AVoD platform in Germany (SevenOneMedia 2017: 28-29), and to discuss the pros 
and cons of YouTube exerting competitive pressure on (i) (other) non-linear audio-
visual media service providers like Amazon and Netflix and (ii) linear audiovisual 
media service providers like TV stations.  
According to a survey conducted by the BVDW (2017) on Digital Trends with focus 
on VoD 51 per cent of the respondents (n=1,049) stated that they use AVoD por-
tals such as YouTube, MyVideo, Clipfish at least once a week. PVoD services such as 
Netflix, Maxdome or Amazon Prime Video are used by 30 per cent of the respond-
ents at least once a week. Even though the ARD-ZDF Onlinestudie 2017 shows dif-
ferent numbers (video usage – at least once a week – in percent for 2017: 31 per 
cent for video portals and 23 per cent for video streaming services) the quintes-
sence is the same (Koch & Frees 2017: 443). AVoD is currently used more often 
than PVoD and, thus, plays a decisive role in overall video consumption. Also 
Kunow (2017: 33-34) reveals that concerning VoD content, AVoD portals, and par-
ticularly YouTube (29.5 per cent), are the most used ones by the population in 
Germany for consuming professional VoD content at least once a month – com-
pared to media libraries of TV channels with 28.4 per cent and online video libraries 
(e.g. Netflix) with 23 per cent. It gets even more interesting when looking at age 
specific usage patterns. Both, the ARD-ZDF Onlinestudie 2017 as well as the BVDW 
survey reveal that the younger the consumers are the more they use AVoD portals 
(Kupferschmitt 2017: 450; BVDW 2017: 7).20 Also, they use AVoD more often than 
PVoD (ibid).  
With respect to YouTube, the Social Media Atlas 2017/2018 revealed that 100 per 
cent of the 14-19-years old and 96 per cent of the 20-29-years old internet users 
consume video contents from YouTube (Statista 2018a).21 Consequently, this video 
platform is obviously highly relevant, especially for the younger generation. As fig-
ure 5 shows, however, even with the older age groups YouTube seems to be a fairly 
relevant media tool. When it comes to entertainment consumption, the attention 
                                                          
20  In the ARD-ZDF Onlinestudie 2017: usage of AVoD portals in total: 57 per cent; for the 14-29-years old: 91 
per cent; for the 30-49-years old: 79 per cent (Kupferschmitt 2017: 450). In the BVDW survey: usage of 
AVoD portals in total: 51 per cent; for the 16-24-years old: 74 per cent; for the 25-34-years old: 66 per cent 
(BVDW 2017: 3, 7). 
21  4th quarter 2017, base: 3,500 internet users, 14+ years (Statista 2018a, based on Faktenkontor; IMWF). 
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of the user is viewed to be the relevant scarce resource (attention economics; inter 
alia, Falkinger 2008). Since users have only limited (media) time during the day to 
spend on video consumption one can argue that they can spend time either on 
AVoD portals (e.g. YouTube) or on PVoD services (e.g. Netflix). This limitation may 
differ considerably between different age groups (and life circumstances) as adults 
often have stronger limits to the time they can spend for entertainment (job, fami-
ly, etc.) than teenagers. Still, every minute spent on watching audiovisual content 
can be either devoted to a PVoD offering or to an AVoD offering. In line with this 
reasoning, YouTube might serve as a substitute for PVoD services and, thus, should 
exert competitive pressure on PVoD providers such as Amazon or Netflix. 
 
 
Figure 5: YouTube usage according to age groups among internet users in Germany in 2017 
Source: translated from Statista (2018a), based on Faktenkontor; IMWF 
 
An argument that would speak against considering YouTube as a relevant competi-
tor to PVoD services is that a lot of YouTube content was non-commercial, i.e. con-
tent like a private cat video, a funny observation, your own dancing performance, 
etc. uploaded by users without commercial intent.22 This non-commercial content 
                                                          
22  The term user generated content has become popular for this type of non-commercial videos. However, on 
the ambiguities and widespread problematic (mis-)use of this term see Gaenssle & Budzinski (2019). 
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might not be comparable to the professional programs provided by PVoD providers 
like Amazon or Netflix. However, while a lot of YouTube content may still be non-
commercial, there is also a lot of commercial content on YouTube. Actually, the 
platform has become increasingly professionalized and commercial during the last 
decade or more (Döring 2014; Ross & Weghake 2015) and its most popular con-
tents is rather commercial, purpose-created and business-strategically uploaded. 
Next to advertising-purpose YouTube channels of business companies, this includes 
commercial YouTube channels from traditional entertainment industries (using it as 
an additional distribution channel for music, movies, broadcastings, comedy, 
sports, etc. – and thus in direct competition with other online and offline distribu-
tion channels) as well as more YouTube-specific entertainment contents like fitness 
videos, styling and lifestyle videos, or gaming and e-sports video content. This latter 
area of social media stars is a highly commercial multimillion dollar business gener-
ating big money from advertising revenues as well as from product placements (so-
called influencer) and merchandising (Budzinski & Gaenssle 2018). As such, the 
largest part of the most popular YouTube contents is directly comparable in terms 
of commercialization and professionalism to the contents of other non-linear and 
linear audiovisual media services like PVoD à la Netflix, Amazon, Sky – or traditional 
TV stations. 
In addition to this, viewing habits – concerning consumption time and content 
types might differ. One would assume that the consumption time of YouTube vide-
os is usually shorter (even though people might watch several videos in a row). The 
PVoD content, by contrast, might usually be watched for a longer time period. The 
assumed differences could go along with the different types of videos aired on 
AVoD portals à la YouTube and PVoD platforms. Whereas YouTube contains a lot of 
short(er) videos, music videos, etc. the users on PVoD platforms can watch whole 
movies, episodes of series23 or documentaries. On the other hand, consumers may 
also watch considerable long chains of videos on YouTube, fuelled by the website’s 
individualized algorithmic recommendation service. 
                                                          
23  Particularly with PVoD platforms (especially with SVoD providers) a typical viewing pattern especially of the 
younger viewers is binge watching – i.e. watching several episodes or even a whole series in a row (Sev-
enOneMedia 2017: 42-45). 
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Looking at actual figures, however, we can observe the following: according to the 
ViewTime Report 2017, YouTube is watched on average 8 minutes/day by the 14-
69-year old users in Q2/2017 (SevonOneMedia 2017: 28f.).24 PVoD is – according to 
that report – used on average for 9 minutes/day by the 14-69-years old and on av-
erage 14 minutes/day by the 14-49-years old in Q2 2017 (SevenOneMedia 2017: 9). 
Thus, the differences in viewing time are marginal and hardly conclusive25. In par-
ticular, for the young generation, however, YouTube (as well as other AVoD por-
tals) may be a close substitute for other ways of watching audiovisual content, be 
they linear or non-linear. 
Furthermore, there are differences in the content types of consumed videos. The 
most favored content types on YouTube have been in Q2/2017 for the 14-69-years 
old: music videos (32 per cent), social media stars (27 per cent), 
news/documentaries/sports (14 per cent), series/movies/TV shows (7 per cent), and 
private videos (6 per cent) (SevenOneMedia 2017: 29). On the one hand, viewing 
habits depart from (other) linear and non-linear audiovisual media services where 
series, movies and TV shows dominate. On the other hand, there is some overlap 
hinting to direct competitive pressure at least for some niches. Moreover, the de-
gree of substitution is determined by the subjective utility of the individual user, i.e. 
what she thinks are close alternatives for dedicating her media time. Watching a 
gamer playing a popular video game or an e-sports event (all falling into the cate-
gory social media stars) may be a close substitute to watching a tennis game or a 
traditional sports event as well as watching YouTube lifestyle stars to watching a TV 
show. It appears to be plausible that the degree of substitution between YouTube 
(AVoD) and PVoD-contents as well as TV will be wildly varying across consumers 
but in general it may be higher for young consumers than for old consumers. While 
this all hints to YouTube not being a perfect competitor to PVoD and TV, it also 
appears to be very plausible that it does exert imperfect competitive pressure – and 
that this will increase with the changing generations. 
                                                          
24  The average usage time for free online videos in total is 15 minutes/day in Q2 2017 (SevenOneMedia 2017: 
9). 
25  It has to be noted, however, that within 30 months, the PVoD usage has increased from on average 3-9 
minutes/day among the 14-69-years old and, thus, shows remarkable growth (SevenOneMedia 2017: 10). 
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Very recently, on June, 18th, 2018, YouTube has started its new subscription-based 
service YouTube Premium26 in Germany (Pimpl 2018). With this service the user gets 
the opportunity to watch advertising-free on-demand videos for € 11.99 per 
month. The videos can be streamed or downloaded for 30 days for being watched 
offline (YouTube Premium 2018). This service is bundled with YouTube Music – a 
paid-for, advertising-free music streaming service.27 This new YouTube service di-
rectly competes with PVoD services such as Netflix. YouTube Premium offers 
YouTube originals (films and series) and thereby also competes in the field of own 
productions with Netflix and Amazon Prime Video (YouTube Premium 2018).  
The preceding discussion focused on the question if YouTube is a relevant market 
player for the VoD market in Germany with respect to the audience side. Surely, it 
is also interesting to assess YouTube’s direct market relevance on the advertising 
side. A recent study by the British market researcher WARC, for instance, has shown 
that large parts of advertising spending worldwide are invested in social media 
channels such as YouTube and Facebook (Nötting 2018). In this context, it will fur-
thermore be interesting to observe how Facebook’s video platform Facebook 
Watch that has started in the United States last year and worldwide at the end of 
August 2018 (Perez 2018) will perform.   
 
3 The Antitrust Cases against Amazonas and Germany’ Gold 
In Germany, both the publicly-financed TV producers and the market-leading 
commercial TV enterprises planned to enter the VoD market, each with a coopera-
tive project – “Germany’s Gold” in the case of the public service broadcasters, 
“Amazonas” in the case of the leading commercial TV stations. For the purpose of 
realizing these two projects, the parent companies planned to create a commonly 
owned subsidiary that was to be responsible for running the cooperative platform. 
Since the TV stations are competitors in the same market, the creation of a com-
mon VoD subsidiary constitutes either a horizontal merger through the common 
subsidiary (effectively a syndicate) or a horizontal cartel run by the common subsid-
                                                          
26  The VoD service originally started in the US and has been formerly known as YouTube Red (Pimpl 2018). 
27  The music streaming service is also available separately to YouTube Premium as YouTube Music Premium for 
€ 9.99 per months (Pimpl 2018). 
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iary – depending on organizational details. However, the economic effects are likely 
to be very similar. Since horizontal mergers as well as horizontal collusion may re-
duce the incentive of the merging or colluding companies (here: the owners of the 
common subsidiary) to compete with each other (also in other markets), such pro-
jects are typically subject to the approval of the competent competition authority. 
Mergers are only allowed according to German competition law if they do not cre-
ate or strengthen a dominant market position and/or do not significantly impede 
effective competition. Horizontal collusion is generally prohibited with exceptions. 
Both is assessed by the FCO, which, in cases of concerns, launches an in-depth in-
vestigation and eventually decides to block the project, to clear the project or to 
clear the project subject to conditions. After thorough investigations of the Ama-
zonas project and the Germany’s Gold project, the cartel office raised severe con-
cerns regarding potential anticompetitive effects which eventually led to both pro-
jects being abandoned. Before we assess these decisions and developments in the 
light of the insights from the first two sections of this paper (section 3.3), we de-
scribe the projects and the related antitrust cases (sections 3.1 and 3.2). 
 
3.1 The Amazonas Case 
In 2010, the two leading commercial TV broadcasters in Germany, the RTL group 
and the ProSiebenSat.1 group, intended to create a common video-on-demand in-
ternet platform under the working title “Amazonas”. Through this platform, users 
would have been able to access professional video content online, which had been 
broadcasted on traditional TV (cable, satellite, free-to-air) before. A common sub-
sidiary of the online companies of the two groups (RTL interactive GmbH and ProS-
iebenSat.1 Media AG, each holding 50 per cent of the shares) was to be established 
and assigned with the tasks of content storage, content delivery and streaming ser-
vices. Editorial and marketing services, however, would have operated by the 
broadcasting companies themselves for their own content. The platform was 
planned to be open for third-party content as long as the third party provided its 
own editorial and marketing services. Users would have been able to access the 
Amazonas content for free (price = 0) with revenues from online advertising 
sought to be financing the platform. While advertising revenues were to go to the 
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content providers, each content provider (RTL, ProSiebenSat.1, third parties) was to 
pay a fee to Amazonas for its services (hosting, storage, streaming).  
The two parent companies are the two – by a substantial margin – leading com-
mercial TV broadcasters in Germany. At the time of the planned VoD platform, the 
RTL group (RTL) ran the TV stations RTL, Vox, SuperRTL (all full programs) and n-tv 
(news station) as well as several pay TV channels (RTL Crime, RTL Living, RTL Pas-
sion).28 Furthermore, RTL holds a 35.9 per cent-share in the full program channel 
RTL2. Altogether, in 2009, RTL accumulated a market share of roughly 26 per cent 
in terms of viewership and approximately 45 per cent of the TV advertising reve-
nues. The ProSiebenSat.1 group (P7S1) comprised the TV channels Sat.1, ProSieben, 
Kabel 1, Sixx (all full programs) and 9live (advertising and sales channel; until Au-
gust 2011) as well as several pay TV channels (kabel eins classics, Sat.1 Come-
dy/emotions, ProSieben Fun, wetter.com TV).29 Furthermore, the group owns the 
VoD platform maxdome. ProSiebenSat.1 reached a market share of about 22 per 
cent in the audience market and up to 45 per cent in the advertising market. 
The two companies notified their plans to create a common video-on-demand plat-
form to the merger control of the European Commission on August 5th, 2010. 
However, the European Commission delegated the case to the FCO because the 
dominant core of the economic activities of the project lied within Germany.30 The 
FCO investigated the case and eventually enjoined the project due to expected anti-
competitive effects on March 17th, 2011 (Bundeskartellamt 2011a). The anticom-
petitive concerns leading to the block of the Amazonas project by the FCO rest on 
the following assessment: the merger of the VoD-activities of RTL and P7S1 would 
have strengthened their already dominant duopoly on the market for TV advertis-
ing (Bundeskartellamt 2011a).  
The FCO defines an extended market for TV advertising as audiovisual advertising 
irrespective of the broadcasting medium (free-to-air, cable, satellite – or now inter-
net). Therefore, so-called in-stream advertising – advertising within the stream of 
audiovisual contents, in a way similar to traditional TV commercials (Pellikan 2010: 
                                                          
28  In 2012, an additional full program channel, RTL Nitro, was added. 
29  In 2012 and 2013 respectively, the channels Sat.1 Gold and ProSieben Maxx were added. 
30  For an analysis of the referral rules between the European Commission and national competition agencies 
within the European Union see Budzinski (2006). 
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262; Bell 2013: 50) – is viewed to belong to the so-defined market for TV advertis-
ing. In contrast, so-called in-page advertising (via banners, pop-ups, overlays, etc.) 
is not viewed to be part of the same market due to its different character (Bun-
deskartellamt 2011a: 15-23).  
Due to the high market shares on the traditional TV advertising market (without 
internet) – RTL and P7S1 combine up to 90 per cent of the market – the FCO estab-
lished a duopoly market structure. Moreover, the FCO argues that this duopoly al-
ready lack effective competition before the creation of the common VoD-subsidiary 
of the duopolists. Instead, the FCO assumes a rather collusive equilibrium between 
RTL and P7S1 on the advertising market based upon several indications like (i) a 
high symmetry of the duopolists, (ii) high market transparency facilitating implic-
it/tacit collusion, (iii) rather homogenous goods (an advertising minute is an adver-
tising minute), (iv) the existence of an effective sanctioning mechanism for devia-
tions from the collusive equilibrium (discounts on advertising prices may be fol-
lowed by an immediate response from the other duopolist so that any competitive 
advantage is instantly countered), and, in particular, (v) the absence of effective 
competition in the past, evidenced by constant market shares over several years as 
well as virtually no deviations between the advertising prices of the two companies 
(and the absence of discount campaigns) (Bundeskartellamt 2011a: 25-47). Fur-
thermore, the collusive duopoly is stabilized because of the lack of outside compe-
tition by close substitutes. According to the FCO (Bundeskartellamt 2011a: 47-55), 
in 2010 existing VoD platforms or alternative in-stream advertising were neither big 
enough nor growing fast enough to exert competitive pressure on RTL and P7S1. 
For instance, Google’s YouTube was not counted as a competitor because of a no-
torious lack of professional contents and the preference of the advertising industry 
to place ads in the environment of professional contents (Bundeskartellamt 2011a: 
54-55). High entry barriers further stabilize the dominant duopoly (Bun-
deskartellamt 2011a: 49-52). 
According to the analysis of the FCO, RTL and P7S1 enjoy a (tacitly) collusive duo-
poly even before the creation of a common subsidiary and do not effectively com-
pete with each other on the advertising market. The common VoD-subsidiary, thus, 
would further strengthen the dominant position by extending the collusive equilib-
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rium to the new channel for TV contents, the internet – according to the reasoning 
of the FCO (Bundeskartellamt 2011a: 55-76). Inter alia, the symmetry of the duopo-
lists, market transparency, the harmonization of technological competition parame-
ters (video player, digital rights management-technologies, etc.) as well as the in-
centives for tacitly collusive behavior and for foreclosure towards competing con-
tents are further extended and strengthened.  
From the perspective of the FCO, several aspects of the case (as described) do not 
only violate the rules of merger control but also the anti-cartel rules (Bun-
deskartellamt 2011a: 81-100). Through the common subsidiary, RTL and P7S1 may 
be viewed to organize an anticompetitive cartel. Therefore, the FCO prohibited the 
Amazonas project both on the grounds of an anticompetitive concentration (mer-
ger control) and against the background of the cartel prohibition. 
 
3.2 Germany’s Gold Case 
Roughly at the same time as RTL and P7S1, the two leading commercial TV provid-
ers, Germany’s two public service broadcasters (PSBs), the ARD group and ZDF, 
planned a similar VoD-online platform, labeled “Germany’s Gold” (Bun-
deskartellamt 2011b; Martini 2012). Their VoD-subsidiary was also conceptualized 
to provide former TV content, both from the PSBs and from third parties. Unlike 
Amazonas, however, not all contents would have been offered for a zero price (and 
financed by advertising). Additionally, subscription and pay-per-view models were 
considered. Furthermore, next to hosting, storage and streaming services, Germa-
ny’s Gold would have provided editorial and marketing services.  
While the specific ownership construct was more complicated (WDR media group 
2012), at the end of the day, the parents would have been the two German PSB 
groups. The ARD group consists of regional broadcasting corporations. With its 
more than 10 national and local TV channels, it reached an audience market share 
of about 28 per cent – a that-time market leading figure. The other PSB, ZDF, 
broadcasts 4 nationwide channels (ZDF, ZDFinfo, ZDFneo, ZDFkultur31), with which 
it reached an audience share of 14 per cent. Furthermore, ARD and ZDF share the 
                                                          
31  At the time of the case, the names of the channels were ZDF infokanal, ZDF dokukanal and ZDFtheaterkanal. 
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ownership of the TV channels 3sat (ARD and ZDF 32.5 per cent each), Phoenix (50 
per cent each), KiKa (50 per cent each) and ARTE (25 per cent each). The audience 
market share of these channels was below 3 per cent, though. While ARD and ZDF 
reach significant market shares in the audience market, also vis-à-vis the two lead-
ing commercial groups (2004: ARD/ZDF 45 per cent vs. RTL/P7S1 48 per cent), the 
picture looks different in the advertising market. The PSB are mainly financed by a 
special tax and are only allowed to broadcast advertising under strict restrictions. 
Consequently, they reach comparably low market shares in the TV advertising mar-
ket – in 2009 about 8 per cent with ARD about 5 per cent and ZDF about 3 per 
cent. 
ARD and ZDF notified their intent to create a common VoD platform in October 
2010 to the FCO (Bundeskartellamt 2011b). Due to the low shares of the PSBs on 
the TV advertising market, the FCO found that the project did not create or 
strengthen a dominant market position. Thus, in contrast to the similar project of 
the two leading commercial broadcasters, the German competition agency did not 
block the common VoD-subsidiary of the two PSBs on the grounds of merger con-
trol (Bundeskartellamt 2011b, 2013a). However, the FCO found anticompetitive 
concerns that the project would constitute a cartel. In particular, the intended co-
ordination of prices (subscription model, pay-per-view model, marketing services) 
as well as the influence on the platform on contents (editorial services) would set 
incentives for foreclosure and further extend the distortion of competition between 
commercial TV broadcasters and PSBs that results from the tax revenues of the lat-
ter (Bundeskartellamt 2013a). Consequently, the FCO outlined that the project 
could only be cleared if the platform would be restricted to hosting, storage and 
streaming services – and would abstain from editorial and marketing services. 
However, ARD and ZDF were not willing to comply with such conditions and aban-
doned the project (Bundeskartellamt 2013b). 
 
3.3 Critical Reflection in the Light of New Media Economics 
From today’s perspective, the reasoning of the FCO only partially fits to the empiri-
cal picture and the modern economic theory of both the TV and the VoD market. 
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Of course, hindsight is a benefit, in particular in dynamic markets. Thus, it remains 
open for assessment whether the current development could have been expected 
about eight years ago when the FCO conducted its investigations and made its de-
cisions. Notwithstanding, ex post analysis of competition policy decisions repre-
sents an important tool for policy learning and for improving future decisions in 
comparable cases (Budzinski 2013). Thus, pointing out the ex post problems and 
flaws of FCO’s analysis and conclusions may help to guide future decisions regard-
ing VoD- and related markets. The dynamics and current developments in the Ger-
man VoD market indicate that collaborations and partnerships are highly attractive, 
particularly for the traditional broadcasters in order to position against the domi-
nant players Amazon and Netflix. In June 2018, for instance, ProSiebenSat.1 and 
the US-media company Discovery announced to expand their joint video platform 
7TV32 with their video streaming services Maxdome and Eurosport-Player that shall 
offer movies, series and live sports (Winterbauer 2018).33 Max Conze, CEO of ProSi-
ebenSat.1, in this context wants to establish the “leading streaming platform for 
Germany” and invited the RTL group as well as the public service broadcasters ARD 
and ZDF to join these plans (Winterbauer 2018, Meedia 2018a).  
The analysis of the FCO some eight years ago focused strongly on an alleged mar-
ket dominant duopoly in the German TV advertising market and the negative ver-
dict on the proposed Amazonas project rested predominantly on an increase of this 
collective dominance. This assessment stands in line with earlier cases tackling the 
German TV advertising market, in particular the (also prohibited) Spring-
er/ProSiebenSat.1-merger (Bundeskartellamt 2006). In both cases, the FCO identi-
fies a considerable number of market characteristics that facilitate a collusive equi-
librium (Bundeskartellamt 2006: 29-38, 2011a: 25-55).34 The conclusion that Ger-
man TV advertising market actually finds itself in such a collusive equilibrium with 
coordinated effects (an uncompetitive duopoly), and its underlying economic anal-
                                                          
32  7TV was set up in 2017 and had been cleared by the FCO (Bundeskartellamt 2018b). 
33  On 23 July 2018 the FCO approved the project plans to expand 7TV (Bundeskartellamt 2018b). 
34  Economic theory identifies several market characteristics that facilitate the emergence of tacitly collusive 
structures, namely (i) a limited number of competitors, (ii) a high degree of homogeneity in terms of prod-
ucts and cost structures, (iii) a high level of market transparency, (iv) significant barriers to entry, (v) the ab-
sence of significant buyer power, (vi) a low probability of detection and legal sanctions, (vii) multi-market 
contacts, (viii) past experience with coordination, and (ix) a stable economic environment. See Aigner et al. 
(2006: 312-319) for a review of the economic theory and competition policy of so-called coordinated ef-
fects. 
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ysis, however, have received critical review by the economic literature (Budzinski & 
Wacker 2007: 291-295; Dewenter 2007b). In this paper, we do not want to repeat 
this discussion because, from an ex pots point of view, other factors and develop-
ments may have put its relevance into perspective. In particular, we discuss (i) the 
relevance of the audience market for advertising competition in the light of modern 
media economics, (ii) potential competitive pressure by new market entries of linear 
audiovisual media services, (iii) potential competitive pressure by nonlinear audio-
visual media services, and (iv) competitive pressure by non-TV online advertising.  
(i) The Relevance of the Audience Market for Advertising Competition in the 
Light of Modern Media Economics 
From the perspective of modern media economics, platform economics play a 
prominent role in analyzing business models in the VoD market (see section 2.1). 
However, the theory of two-sided markets is neither mentioned, nor applied to the 
Amazonas case – despite its obvious fit to an advertising-revenue based online plat-
form offering free content. Furthermore, the core business of the commercial 
broadcasters creating Amazonas – advertising-revenue based free commercial TV – 
also fits the definition and characteristics of two-sided market theory. Even though 
modern platform economics are quite a new theoretical framework, its application 
in competition policy cases is already widespread accepted.35 The FCO applied it in 
several cases as well, some of them dating back to the time of the Amazonas-
decision and beyond (Dittmann et al. 2018), but surprisingly ignored it when it 
came to analyzing television and linear audiovisual media markets (irrespective of 
the broadcasting medium). The non-application of platform economics leads to 
neglecting important aspects. In particular, the interrelation of the advertising mar-
ket and the audience market plays an important role for competition intensity here. 
When deriving its claim of an uncompetitive duopoly on the German TV advertising 
market (linear audiovisual media services), the FCO ignores the competitive forces 
on the audience market and concentrates on the shares, pricing strategies and oth-
er characteristics of the advertising market. However, on two-sided markets the 
strategies towards the two distinct demand groups (viewers/users on one side and 
                                                          
35  The competition law reform in Germany in 2017 explicitly requires considering platform economics in anti-
trust cases involving platforms (Budzinski 2017; Budzinski & Stöhr 2018). 
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advertisers on the other) are interrelated: due to the strong network externality 
from viewers/users towards advertisers, the ability to exert market power on the 
advertising side crucially depends on the number of viewers and users – on the au-
dience figures (absolute and relative). Consequently, the market shares on the au-
dience market matter more than in the assessment of the FCO.  
If the commercial TV broadcasters, for instance, lose audience share, it negatively 
affect their ability to set high prices on the advertising market. This is true for los-
ing audience to other commercial TV broadcasters (which may be said to be directly 
reflected in the shares of the advertising market). However, this is also true for los-
ing audience to PSBs. Thus, despite their strong restrictions on the advertising mar-
ket, the PSBs (ARD group and ZDF) exert competitive pressure on the commercial 
TV broadcasters (RTL and P7S1) through their strong presence on the audience 
market. Keep in mind that the German PSBs altogether reached more than 40 per 
cent audience market share, whereas the RTL group reached 26 per cent and P7S1 
about 22 per cent (see sections 3.1 and 3.2). From a two-sided market perspective, 
the advertising duopoly between RTL and P7S1 is restricted in its ability to abuse its 
market position (anticompetitive pricing strategies) by the competitive pressure 
from the audience market where there is clearly no such dominant duopoly. The 
same is true for non-price strategies which also depend on both sides of the market 
and its interplay. Furthermore, taking a two-sided market perspective into consid-
eration casts doubt on the different treatment of the Amazonas project and the 
Germany’s Gold project from the dominance point of view – like the FCO did led by 
a single-sided view on the advertising market.  
(ii) Competitive Pressure by New Entries of Linear Audiovisual Media Services 
Next to the issue of competitive pressure within the market, i.e. from incumbent 
linear audiovisual media service suppliers (irrespective of the broadcasting medi-
um), the question of competitive pressure from new market entries needs to be 
discussed. Regarding potential newcomers, the FCO holds without much reasoning 
that they will find it hard to compete with the established stations because of sub-
stantial barriers to entry and barriers of mobility in the German TV market (Bun-
deskartellamt 2006: 36-37, 41; 2011a: 49-52; similar: Rott 2003: 161). However, 
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one must wonder whether this is still valid. One prominent reason for entry barriers 
has always been frequency scarcity. In the face of satellite TV and the increased role 
of digital technologies in terrestrial and cable broadcasting as well as the increasing 
relevance of internet broadcasting, this problem lost much if not all of its previous 
significance.36  
Another remarkable entry barrier is represented by the ability to offer a full-range 
program, which in the first place is restricted by the availability and price of intel-
lectual property rights (shows, concepts, etc.). However, existing entry barriers 
must be compared to the abilities and resources of potential entrants in order to 
assess their deterrence effect. At the time of the FCO investigation, internationalisa-
tion activities by big media companies accelerated (Nikolinakos 2004; Idot 2006) 
and potential entrants into the German TV market included big European and 
American TV networks, which dispose over substantial financial resources as well as 
comprehensive broadcasting rights, etc. The decision of the German competition 
agency does not sufficiently clarify why entry barriers should be too high for such 
potential competitors. The FCO merely hints to the fact that no successful major 
entry has taken place in the last couple of years (Bundeskartellamt 2006: 37-38) – 
and, in hindsight, it has been effectively right in its assessment as actually no major 
newcomer (linear audiovisual media service) scored relevant market shares since 
then (neither offline nor online). 
 
(iii) Competitive Pressure by Nonlinear Audiovisual Media Services 
New competitive pressure on the incumbents may not only arise from newcomers 
to the narrow TV market (linear audiovisual media services). Instead, changing con-
sumer habits and technological development may create scope for innovative type 
of services exerting competitive pressure on the TV incumbents by luring away con-
                                                          
36  Besides, the need for a broadcast licence from one of the regional authorities (Landesmedienanstalten) 
constitutes some kind of an institutional barrier to entry. In fact, the conditions that must be met in order 
to get a licence can be characterized as general minimum requirements that are the same for all market 
participants and their fulfilment constitutes a claim for the licence. Thus, the licensing procedure is not per 
se discriminatory. Furthermore, the KEK must consider possible risks for the diversity of opinion (e.g. caused 
by concentration of ownership). For detailed information see the relevant wording of the law in the RStV 
(Rundfunkstaatsvertrag), available at http://www.lfm-nrw.de/downloads/rstv_8.pdf, and in addition for ex-
ample in the Landesmediengesetz NRW, available at http://www.lfm-nrw.de/recht/landesmediengesetz/. In 
Germany, even some social media stars need to acquire a broadcast licence if their video portal based “pro-
gram” matches the criteria of linear audiovisual media services (Böhler 2017). 
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sumers with services that better match consumers’ preferences. The emergence of 
nonlinear audiovisual media services (section 2) with their various types of VoD 
business models is certainly the most probable competitor to traditional TV ser-
vices. From the perspective of modern economics, it matters more if these “new” 
services exert competitive pressure on “traditional” TV than whether they formalis-
tically belong to the same market.  
As our discussion in section 2 demonstrates, the 2010 assessment by the FCO that 
VoD platforms were neither big enough nor growing fast enough to exert competi-
tive pressure on RTL and P7S1 (Bundeskartellamt 2011a: 47-55) cannot be uphold 
with hindsight. Firstly, the growth of VoD in the past decade as well as its reach 
has clearly reached areas of relevance to traditional TV. Although, to our best 
knowledge, there is a lack of empirical studies directly tracing substitution effects 
and elasticities between linear and nonlinear audiovisual media services is lacking, 
it cannot be denied that TV incumbents experience competitive pressure by VoD 
alternatives, in particular with respect to young consumers (Kupferschmitt 2017). 
Secondly, the leading players in the PVoD market – Amazon and Netflix – represent 
new competitors and the VoD market positions of the TV incumbents, both com-
mercial and PSB, are far away from market-leading. Next to online retailers and 
specialized VoD firms, in particular big telecommunication companies represent 
new players in the market. It is difficult to assess whether this development could 
have been anticipated by the FCO some eight years ago. On the one hand, the dy-
namics were already visible (see figure 2 and generally section 2). For instance, the 
TV stations already experienced audience losses among younger target groups and 
their changing video consumption behavior when they brought their VoD projects 
back in 2010 (Zubayr & Gerhard 2016: 142-144). On the other hand, today’s mar-
ket-leading players in PVoD were not relevant in Germany back then (Netflix started 
VoD services in 2007, in Germany 2014; Amazon in 2006 and 2014, respectively). 
Still, there already visible potential may have been underestimated. 
From an ex post perspective and in the light of section 2.3, it also seems inappro-
priate to discount YouTube as a competitive force due its alleged lack of profes-
sional contents (Bundeskartellamt 2011a: 54-55). Firstly, the commercialization of 
YouTube contents renders this assessment obsolete with hindsight. It may play a 
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role here that commercially highly successful new content types – for instance in 
the context of so-called YouTube stars (see section 2.3) – were underestimated be-
cause their producers were true newcomers and did not origin from within the in-
cumbents of the media sphere, causing an ignorance-based badmouthing of them 
being “non-professional” by previous (antiquated?) journalistic standards and hab-
its. From an economics perspective, the impressive commercial success of this mil-
lion dollar business speaks a different language (Budzinski & Gaenssle 2018; 
Gaenssle & Budzinski 2019). Secondly, however, YouTube’s attractiveness to the 
audience matters irrespective of the degree of professionalism of its contents since 
it creates competitive pressure on the audience side of the market and through this 
channel influences advertising competition as well (platform economics, see 
above). Changing video consumption patterns – away from linear TV towards non-
linear video portals (including both PVoD and AVoD) – matter for the assessment of 
competition and market power. 
In general, competition policy tends to neglect “free” services in the online world 
and focuses too much on paid-for services. The underlying economics of advertis-
ing-based platforms but especially also data-based services (see section 2.1) are just 
becoming popular in antitrust analysis nowadays. For instance, Germany has re-
cently (June 2017) reformed its competition law in order to consider non-turnover-
based values and zero-price-services along with more traditional measures and 
goods (Budzinski 2017; Budzinski & Stöhr 2018). Notwithstanding, it must be not-
ed that zero-price services are also prevalent in the traditional TV markets with its 
free-to-air commercial TV stations – and they exactly were the object of the Ama-
zonas case and decision. 
Altogether, an ex post discussion reveals that competitive pressure from upcoming 
nonlinear audiovisual media services – both PVoD and AVoD à la YouTube – quali-
fied most of the anticompetitive concerns regarding the intended VoD-platforms. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to see either Amazonas or Germany’s 
Gold in market-dominant positions nowadays. Nor does it look likely that they may 
have stabilized any (anyway controversial) TV duopoly. Obviously, it is much more 
difficult to assess how much of the empirical development could have been antici-
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pated or was already on the horizon some eight years ago when the FCO had to 
make its decisions. 
(iv) Competitive Pressure by Non-TV Online Advertising 
Eventually, the FCO concerns in the Amazonas case centre on the advertising mar-
ket and market power towards advertisers. The question whether the VoD project 
Amazonas would have increased market power towards advertisers points to the 
question of competitive pressure by non-TV online advertising and the players on 
the online advertising markets. The FCO considers (offline and online) audiovisual 
advertising and includes in-stream advertising, in particular by Amazonas itself, 
whereas in-page advertising is discarded (Bundeskartellamt 2011a: 15-23). While 
this may be debatable, it needs to be conceded that market definition in online ad-
vertising is notoriously difficult (Ratliff & Rubinfeld 2010). Again, however, Google’s 
YouTube was not considered to represent a competitive force because advertisers 
allegedly did not see it as an alternative to TV advertising due to their preference to 
place ads in the environment of professional contents (Bundeskartellamt 2011a: 
54-55).  
Some eight years later, this assessment cannot be upheld at all. The empirical de-
velopment has clearly revealed that advertisers care about their target groups more 
than about the – perceived, ostensible – professionalism of the content their adver-
tising is placed in. If the relevant target groups for advertisers change their con-
sumption behavior and mass-consume YouTube videos, then the advertising indus-
try follows suit. Today, social media stars including so-caller influencers earn million 
dollar incomes from advertising revenues of their videos (Budzinski & Gaenssle 
2018; Gaenssle & Budzinski 2019). The main revenue sources are (a) from the par-
ticipation of Google’s YouTube advertising revenue, (b) from in-video product 
placement directly paid-for by the advertisers (in particular in so-called how-to-and-
style videos), as well as (c) from direct sponsorship of social media stars (e.g. gam-
er, e-sports). Advertisers clearly appear to be more than happy to place their ads in 
this context while at the same time advertising revenues in traditional TV are de-
clining. The British market researcher WARC just published that spending for online 
video advertising worldwide is forecasted to increase to 30 billion US-dollars in 
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2018 and that particularly YouTube and Facebook will profit from this (Nötting 
2018). Advertisers, thus, follow the changed usage patterns by the consumers, and 
in particular the increased video usage on mobile devices (ibid.). Looking at the net 
advertising revenues in Germany in 2017 spending on “television” increased only 
slightly (+0.7% to 2016) whereas the overall spending for “online and mobile”37 
increased by +8% at the same time (ZAW 2017). According to Statista (2018b) the 
gross revenues in video advertising (desktop and mobile) in Germany were at 321 
million Euros in 2017 and are forecasted to increase up to 613 million Euros in 
2022.  
Furthermore, market power has indeed become a relevant problem in the online 
advertising industry. However, none of the traditional TV companies plays a role 
here. Instead, the European Commission (2018) very recently claimed that 
YouTube’s parent company Google enjoys Europe-wide (and probably beyond that) 
market power in online advertising. More precisely, a statement of objections 
against Google’s AdSense service targets practices in advertising management for 
third-parties, which is the most relevant element of the modern online advertising 
supply chain and in which Google’s AdSense is leading. In the face of this antitrust 
case, it seems highly doubtful that German commercial TV stations can exert rele-
vant market power on advertisers against or independent from Google’s grip on 
the online advertising world. 
Altogether, an ex post view on the Amazonas decision and the parallel Germany’s 
Gold case indicates that the actual development has considerably departed from 
the expectations some eight years ago. Market dynamics have eroded the anticom-
petitive concerns of the time and, in hindsight, it is difficult to uphold that Amazo-
nas and/or Germany’s Gold would have generated considerable anticompetitive 
effects. Given the importance that YouTube already had at the time and further 
extended since then as well as the might of PVoD entrants (Amazon, Netflix, tele-
communication giants), it also appears to be highly implausible that Amazonas and 
Germany’s Gold could have erected a duopoly with sufficient entry barriers to keep 
international VoD platforms outside the market (and prevent the changes in video 
                                                          
37  Online and Mobile thereby exclude search advertising and affiliate marketing (ZAW 2018). 
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consumption patterns towards video portals like YouTube). Quite in contrast, do-
mestic media appears to play no significant role in the new world of nonlinear au-
diovisual media services. However, it is difficult to assess the role of the FCOs deci-
sion some eight years ago regarding today’s lack of competitiveness of German 
media in VoD markets. 
 
4 Conclusion 
The markets for audiovisual content are subject to dynamic change. Where once 
“traditional” (free-to-air, cable, satellite) television was dominating, i.e. linear audi-
ovisual media services, displays nowadays strong growth of different types of vid-
eo-on-demand, i.e. nonlinear audiovisual media services, including both PVoD like 
Amazon Prime and Netflix and AVoD like YouTube. Competition policy decisions in 
such dynamic markets are always particularly challenging, in particular in the areas 
of competition policy that require considering and estimating effects happening in 
the future (merger control, abuse of dominance). The FCO was presented such a 
challenge when at the beginning of the 2010s German television providers sought 
to enter online VoD markets with the help of cooperative platforms: one for the 
commercial advertising-financed stations (called Amazonas) competing with one 
for the PSBs (Germany’s Gold). Back then, online PVoD was in its infancy, whereas 
AVoD already attracted massive audiences – with both VoD-types displaying dy-
namic growth. Focusing on PVoD and dismissing significant entry threats, the FCO 
concluded severe antitrust concerns and outright prohibited the Amazonas project 
while confronting the Germany’s Gold project with demand for strict and far-
reaching obligations and commitments, eventually leading to the project being 
abandoned. 
Some eight years later, we review the assessment of the FCO in an ex post analysis 
with the benefit of hindsight. In doing so, we first discuss the dynamic develop-
ment of the German VoD markets during the last decade with a special focus on 
the role of AVoD portals like YouTube. In the second part of this paper, we con-
front our results with the 2011-analysis of the FCO. We find four aspects, in which 
the previous assessments cannot be upheld from today’s perspective (with the 
benefit of hindsight). First, the FCO neglected relevant implications of modern plat-
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form economics casting doubt on the stability and power of the alleged uncompet-
itive duopoly in the German TV advertising market. Second, in terms of an effects-
based analysis including platform economics, the differences in the assessment of 
the two projects appear to be inappropriate. Third, and more importantly, the 
emerging competitive pressure of nonlinear audiovisual media service providers 
was and became significantly more relevant and stronger than accounted for in the 
Amazonas- and Germany’s Gold-cases. The entry of powerful new international 
players in the PVoD market, like Amazon, several telecommunication giants, and 
international market leader Netflix eroded possibly remaining elements of market 
power by German television providers. Quite in contrast, one could fundamentally 
question the future competitiveness of German television providers in the changing 
market. Furthermore, the exclusion of AVoD portals as competitors neither fits to 
changing video consumption patterns, nor to the commercial importance and 
character of YouTube and co. In particular, the assumption that AVoD content is 
non-professional and an inadequate environment for advertisers is spectacularly 
wrong an ex post perspective – and probably was already doubtful some eight 
years ago. Fourth, the question of market power on advertising markets including 
online advertising nowadays rather points to internet giants (e.g. the Google Ad-
Sense case) than to a special position of television companies. 
With the benefit of hindsight, things naturally may look very different than at the 
time of the case analysis by the competition authority. Therefore, the merit of ex 
post analyses lies not so much in detecting mistakes in analysis or judgment. Ra-
ther, their merit is to create knowledge about mismatches of expected/predicted 
and actual developments in order to improve competition policy learning. Our pa-
per intends to contribute to the creation of this type of knowledge. 
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